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Recent Developments
THE VALIDITY OF SOBRIETY ROADBLOCKS IN PENNSYLVANIA
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1987 case of Commonwealth v. Tarbert,I the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania considered the validity of systematic roadblocks for the de-
tection of drunk drivers, commonly referred to as "sobriety road-
blocks". 2 A plurality held that the use of sobriety roadblocks was
unlawful for want of specific statutory authorization. 3 The court split,
however, on the validity of such roadblocks under the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 4 In 1985, the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code was
amended to authorize the use of sobriety roadblocks; 5 however, since
the incidents at issue in Tarbert occurred in 1983 and 1984, the court
1. 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035 (1987).
2. A sobriety roadblock is a temporary checkpoint where police officers sys-
tematically stop automobiles in order to determine whether the drivers are
under the influence of alcohol. See generally 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 10.8, at 69-70 (2d ed. 1987) (discussed in Tarbert). For a discussion of the
characteristics of a standard sobriety roadblock, see infra notes 41-43 and ac-
companying text.
3. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 297, 535 A.2d at 1045. For a discussion of the plural-
ity opinion, see infra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
4. Chief Justice Nix wrote the opinion announcing the judgment of the
court in which Justice Flaherty concurred. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 298, 535 A.2d at
1045. Justices Zappala and Papadakos both filed separate concurring opinions.
Id. Justice Larsen filed a dissenting opinion. Id. FormerJustice Hutchinson did
not participate in the decision of the case. Id. For a summary of these opinions,
see infra note 8.
5. The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code now provides:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehi-
cles or has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of
this title, he may stop a vehicle, upon a request on signal, for the pur-
pose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsi-
bility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver's
license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reason-
ably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this code.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (emphasis added)
(amending 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985)).
The previous, applicable section of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code
stated:
When a police officer has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect
a violation of this title, he may stop a vehicle, upon request on signal,
for the purpose of inspecting the vehicle as to its equipment and opera-
tion, or vehicle identification number, or to secure such other informa-
tion as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the
provisions of this title.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985), amended by 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
(655)
1
Coyne: The Validity of Sobriety Roadblocks in Pennsylvania
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
construed a predecessor statute. The purpose of this article is to alert
attorneys to arguments with which to attack the constitutionality of so-
briety roadblocks.
There are two ways that the issue of the validity of sobriety road-
blocks could arise. First, the statute authorizing sobriety roadblocks
could be challenged as per se invalid under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. Based upon the success of such challenges in other states, 6 and
upon Tarbert, it is probable that the statute authorizing the use of sobri-
ety roadblocks would be upheld. 7 Second, the issue could arise through
6. Only three states have held sobriety roadblocks unconstitutional per se.
See State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 569 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Boyanovsky, 304
Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (1987); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755
P.2d 775 (1988) (en banc).
Nineteen jurisdictions have upheld sobriety roadblocks. See Stark v.
Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz.
45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299,
241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987); State v. Abelson, 485 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984); People v. Bar-
tley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986);
State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987);
State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan.
529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1105 (1984); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143
(Me. 1985); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985); Opinion of the Justices, 128
N.H. 14, 509 A.2d 744 (1986); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d
131 (1980); City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (Ct.
App. 1987); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1984); State v. Gaines, 16 Ohio App. 3d 168, 474 N.E.2d 1219 (1984); Lowe v.
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084
(1986).
Some jurisdictions have held sobriety roadblocks invalid because particular
circumstances of the stops were such that the court could not conclude that the
roadblock under review was a reasonable seizure. See Ekstrom v. Justice Court,
136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983); State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986);
State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988); State v. McLauglin,
471 N.E.2d 1123 (Ind. 1984); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137,
449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);
State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d 461 (1986); State v. Koppel, 127 N.H.
286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985); State v. Egan, 213 N.J. Super. 133, 516 A.2d 1115
(1986); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976); Webb v. State, 695
S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442
(1985).
7. In Tarbert, four Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices, Chief Justice Nix,
and Justices McDermott, Papadakos, and Larsen, concluded that sobriety road-
blocks were valid under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 298,
535 A.2d at 1045. Justice Flaherty concurred in the outcome but did not file an
opinion. Id. Justice Zappala concluded that sobriety roadblocks were unconsti-
tutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. Former Justice Hutchinson
did not participate in the decision of the case. Id. Since the personnel of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not changed since Tarberi, there still remains a
four justice majority in favor of upholding sobriety roadblocks. For a summary
of the views of the justices in Tarbert, see infra note 8.
Furthermore, in a recent opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held
656 [Vol. 34: p. 655
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a challenge on state constitutional grounds to the validity of the use of
sobriety roadblocks in the particular case. Tarbert provides useful guide-
lines for examining this question because four justices filed opinions dis-
cussing the validity of systematic roadblocks. 8 This article will analyze
Tarbert9 and will present a structured analysis of state constitutional ar-
guments"° with an emphasis on defending a client who is charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol as a result of being stopped at a
sobriety roadblock.' I
that the use of sobriety roadblocks after the effective date of the 1985 amend-
ment to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code did not violate the Pennsylvania
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Com-
monwealth v. Fiorretti, 371 Pa. Super. 535, 542-50, 538 A.2d 570, 573-78
(1988). For a discussion of the Fiorretti case, see infra note 21 and accompanying
text. See also State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295 n.2, 756 P.2d 1057, 1066-
67 n.2 (1988) (Walters, J., dissenting) (noting that Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Tarbert upheld use of sobriety roadblocks).
Finally, a majority ofjurisdictions which have addressed the issue of sobri-
ety roadblocks hold that sobriety roadblocks are constitutionally permissible.
For a list of these jurisdictions, see supra note 6.
8. For a concise summary of the views of the justices, see Fioretti, 371 Pa.
Super. at 543 n. 12, 538 A.2d at 574 n. 12. ChiefJustice Nix, writing the plurality
opinion in Tarbert, concluded that sobriety roadblocks, conducted within pre-
scribed guidelines, do not violate a driver's right of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at
293, 535 A.2d at 1043. However, Chief Justice Nix's opinion rested upon the
finding that the police exceeded their authority in conducting the roadblocks
prior to the August 19, 1985, amendment to the Motor Vehicle Code. Id. at 297,
535 A.2d at 1045 (Flaherty, J., concurring in result). Justice Flaherty concurred
in the result without writing an opinion. Id. at 298, 535 A.2d at 1045 (Flaherty,
J. concurring in result). Justice Papadakos concurred in the result based upon
ChiefJustice Nix's analysis of the 1983 statute. Id. at 301-02, 535 A.2d at 1047
(Papadakos,J., concurring). Justice Papadakos agreed that roadblocks were con-
stitutional as long as they were conducted within well-defined parameters. Id. at
301, 535 A.2d at 1047 (Papadakos,J., concurring). Justice Zappala concurred in
the result on the grounds that sobriety roadblocks were unconstitutional if con-
ducted without probable cause. Id. at 301, 535 A.2d at 1045 (Zappala, J., con-
curring). Justice Larsen dissented on the grounds that the roadblocks were
acceptable as a reasonable exercise of the police power under the 1983 statute.
Id. at 302, 535 A.2d at 1047 (Larsen,J., dissenting). By implication, it is reason-
able to conclude that Justice Larsen agrees with the plurality that sobriety road-
blocks are constitutionally valid. See Fioretti, 371 Pa. Super. at 543 n.12, 538
A.2d 570, 574 n.12. For a discussion of ChiefJustice Nix's views, see iinfra notes
30-56 and accompanying text. For a discussion ofJustice Papadakos' views, see
infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Justice Zappala's
views, see infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the arguments set forth in Tarbert, see itnfra notes 12-
25 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the arguments with which to defend a client who is
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, see infra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text.
11. The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code states:
A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of any vehicle while: (1) under the influence of alcohol
which renders the person incapable of safe driving; (2) under (he inllu-
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II. BACKGROUND
To be valid under the Pennsylvania Constitution, 12 a sobriety road-
block cannot violate the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. '3 The language of the Pennsylvania constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is substantially similar to the
fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution.' 4 It is well established,
however, that the federal constitutional provisions provide a minimal
guarantee; a state has the power to grant more protection than that pro-
vided by the Federal Constitution.1 5 Yet cases analyzing state constitu-
tional provisions rely on federal precedents to shape their
interpretations.' 6 Under both federal and Pennsylvania law, for exam-
ence of any controlled substance ...to a degree which renders the
person incapable of safe driving; (3) under the combined influence of
alcohol and any controlled substance which renders the person incapa-
ble of safe driving; or (4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood
of the person is 0.10% or greater.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
12. This article discusses the validity of sobriety roadblocks under the
Pennsylvania Constitution. For a discussion of the validity of sobriety road-
blocks under the Federal Constitution, see Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under
the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457
(1983).
13. PA. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Pennsylvania Constitution states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and posses-
sions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to
search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without
describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Id.
14. For the text of the fourth amendment, see infra note 18.
15. See Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 283, 535 A.2d at 1037. ChiefJustice Nix stated:
"This Court has not hesitated to interpret the Pennsylvania Constitution as af-
fording greater protection to defendants than the federal Constitution." Id.,
535 A.2d at 1038 (citing Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457
(1983)).
16. Id. The Tarbert court recognized that federal fourth amendment inter-
pretations are instructive where those decisions are found to be "logically per-
suasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies
underlying specific constitutional guarantees." Id. (quoting Brennan, Slate Co,-
stilutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977)).
See also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1987) (interpreting California Constitution more expansively than Federal
Constitution); People v.John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864, 453 N.Y.S.2d
158 (1982) (interpreting New York Constitution more expansively than Federal
Constitution).
While the United States Supreme Court has never had occasion to deter-
mine whether the fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution would permit
sobriety roadblocks, the Court has discussed roadblocks in other contexts. See
l)elaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random automobile stops are invalid
tinder fourth amendment unless officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that
motorist has violated law); United States v. Martinez-Ftierte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (warrantless stops at permanent checkpoints for purpose of discovering
immigration law violations are valid under fourth amendment); United States v.
658 [Vol. 34: p. 655
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pie, an automobile stop and the detention of its occupants is considered
a seizure. 17 Under both federal and Pennsylvania law, a search and
seizure must be reasonable.' 8 The traditional interpretation of the
fourth amendment is that in order to stop and search an automobile, the
police either must have a warrant or must have a reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. I'9 A sobriety roadblock, by definition, is conducted
without either reasonable suspicion or probable cause that a particular
motorist is driving under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the issue
presented in sobriety roadblock cases is whether the use of such road-
blocks is justified as an exception to the warrant requirement, requiring
neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause. 20
In addition to being susceptible to constitutional challenge, sobriety
roadblocks can be challenged on the grounds that the police lack statu-
tory authorization to conduct such roadblocks. This argument is no
longer effective in Pennsylvania because roadblocks are clearly author-
ized today.2 1 In a state without explicit statutory authorization for sobri-
ety roadblocks, however, this should be the first argument for the
defense. 22
The statutory authorization and state constitutional arguments con-
verged in Tarbert.23 In the lower court decision, a panel of the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania held that a sobriety roadblock violated the search
and seizure provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 4 In Common-
wealth v. Dannaker,2 5 a different panel of the Superior Court held that the
Motor Vehicle Code in force at the time the roadblock took place did
not authorize the use of sobriety roadblocks. These two cases were con-
solidated for appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Tarbert.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (border-patrol stops made without prob-
able cause to believe occupants violated immigration laws are invalid under
fourth amendment).
17. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 284, 535 A.2d at 1038. See also Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 435 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875
(1973).
18. The fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees "[tlhe
right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures
.... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For the text of article I, § 8 of the Penns\lvania
Constitution, see supra note 13.
19. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
20. See State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988).
21. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989). For the text
of § 6308(b), see supra note 5. See also Commonwealth v. Fioretti, 371 lPa. Super.
535, 542, 538 A.2d 570, 579-80 (1988) (section 6308(b) of Pennslvania Motor
Vehicle Code authorizes police to conduct systematic stops without individual-
ized suspicion of illegal activity at sobriety checkpoint roadblocks).
22. See, e.g.. leudeoron, 114 Idaho at 294-95, 756 P.2d at 1058-59.
23. Tarberl, 517 Pa. at 279-81. 535 A.2d at 1036-37.
24. 348 Pa. Super. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985), aff'd o, other groulds, 517 Pa.
277, 535 A.2d at 1035 (1987).
25. 352 Pa. Super. 611, 505 A.2d 1030 (1985), aft'd o, otherg'roiunds, 517 Pa.
277, 535 A.2d 1035 (1987).
1989] 659
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III. ANALYSIS
In Tarbert, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the validity
of sobriety roadblocks on two separate grounds. 26 First, the court con-
sidered whether such roadblocks were constitutional under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution. 2 7 Second, the court considered whether such
roadblocks were authorized by the Pennsylvania General Assembly.28
The statutory authorization issue is moot today because the Penn-
sylvania Motor Vehicle Code has been amended to explicitly authorize
roadblocks. 29 Therefore, this article will discuss the plurality opinion
and concurring opinions on the constitutional issue only.
A. Chief Justice Nix's View: Plurality Opinion
ChiefJustice Nix, writing for the plurality, stated that the constitu-
tionality of a sobriety roadblock must be determined by balancing the
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of a
legitimate governmental interest.30 The advantage of a balancing test,
according to Chief Justice Nix, is that it eliminates the requirement of
probable cause in "an instance where such a requirement would be to-
tally inadequate in protecting the welfare of the public."'' a Moreover,
Chief Justice Nix stated that the approach was especially justified be-
cause the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had recently approved this ap-
proach for determining reasonableness in a sniff-search case by a
narcotics detection canine.3 2
26. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 279-97, 535 A.2d at 1035-45.
27. Id. at 281-94, 535 A.2d at 1037-43.
28. Id. at 294-97, 535 A.2d at 1043-45.
29. For the text of the current version of § 6308(b) of the Pennsylvania Mo-
tor Vehicle Code, see supra note 5.
30. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 285-87, 535 A.2d at 1039. ChiefJustice Nix noted
that this balancing-of-interests approach was first utilized for determining fourth
amendment "reasonableness" in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967). Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 285, 535 A.2d at 1039. In assessing the reasonable-
ness of the governmental intrusion, the Camara Court considered "the strength
of the public interest in effectively combatting the problem, and the ability to
achieve acceptable results by other means, weighed against the extent of the
invasion of the citizen's privacy." Id. at 285-86, 535 A.2d at 1039 (quoting
Camara, 387 U.S. at 537).
31. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 286 n.l, 535 A.2d at 1039 n.1. Chief Justice Nix
noted that highway fatality statistics establish that an automobile used improp-
erly is a deadly instrument. Id. "To continue this carnage by insistence upon a
standard which is obviously inappropriate to address the need would put an ab-
surd gloss on Article I, section 8 of our constitution." Id.
32. Id. at 286, 535 A.2d at 1039 (citing Commonwealth v.Johnston, 515 Pa.
454, 530 A.2d 74 (1987)). InJohnston the court held valid a warrantless "sniff-
search" by a narcotics detection canine in a building where police suspected that
illegal drugs were being stored. Johnston, 515 Pa. at 462-65, 530 A.2d at 78-79.
The.Johnston court noted that the procedure's intrusiveness was minimal where
the police had articulable and reasonable grounds for suspicion. Id. at 466, 530
A.2d at 80.
6
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As further support for the application of a balancing test in the case
of sobriety roadblocks, Chief Justice Nix relied on the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Martinez-Fu-
erte.3 3 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court upheld the constitutionality of sys-
tematic roadblocks conducted by the Border Patrol for the purpose of
apprehending illegal aliens.3 4
Chief Justice Nix noted that in Martinez-Fuerte the United States
Supreme Court analyzed the intrusiveness of a roadblock in terms of
both a subjective and an objective standard.3 5 The subjective intrusion
in Martinez-Fuerte on lawful travelers was considered slight in comparison
to that of a random roving patrol using discretionary stops. 3 6 More-
over, any-objective intrusion was limited because the detention was brief
and the occupants and the vehicle were subjected only to a visual inspec-
tion. 37 Chief Justice Nix suggested that this same analysis was applica-
ble to sobriety roadblocks. 38
Chief Justice Nix also relied on Martinez-Fuerte to reject the argu-
ment that routine checkpoints need always be judicially authorized by a
warrant.39 The Court in Martinez-Fuerte stated that the traditional pur-
poses served by a warrant were inapplicable in the case of Border Patrol
stops. 40 Chief Justice Nix accepted this rationale without explanation.
Chief Justice Nix described the standard sobriety roadblock in
terms of characteristic features, as set forth by Professor Wayne
LaFave. 4 1 The presence of these characteristic attributes can increase
the subjective and objective reasonableness of a roadblock.4 2 The char-
acteristic attributes are: 1) the location and the time of the roadblock's
operation are determined by administrative officers; 2) the officers do
not attempt to secure prior judicial approval for location or conduct be-
forehand; 3) advance warning is provided by a sign indicating that the
motorist is about to be stopped and suggesting the nature of the stop;
4) the site is marked by flashing lights, police vehicles and uniformed
police; 5) a neutral formulae is used for conducting the stop; 6) where
traffic poses safety problems, the officers wave backed-up traffic; 7) after
33. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
34. Id. at 551-53. The routine stops in Nlartinez-Fuerte, like the sobriety
roadblocks in Tarbert, were conducted without warrants and without individual-
ized suspicion. Id.
35. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 288-89, 535 A.2d at 1040. See also Alartinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 560-64.
36. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 288-89, 535 A.2d at 1040 (citing Alartinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 558).
37. Id. at 288, 535 A.2d at 1040 (citing Alartinez-Fuere, 428 U.S. at 558).
38. Id. at 289, 535 A.2d at 1040.
39. Id., 535 A.2d at 1041.
40. See Nlarlinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 564-66.
41. See 4 W. LAFAV, sHpra note 2, § 10.8(d), at 69-70 (quoting Note. supra
note 12, at 1460-63).
42. Tarberl, 517 Pa. at 290, 535 A.2d at 1041.
19891
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stopping a vehicle, the officer attempts to detect whether the motorist is
driving under the influence of alcohol; and 8) the motorist is usually
waived through or directed to a secondary area for further
observation.
4 3
The plurality concluded that sobriety roadblocks, which possess the
above described attributes, satisfy the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 4 The
test for determining whether a sobriety roadblock passes constitutional
muster is the Martinez-Fuerte balancing test.4 5 In Martinez-Fuerte, the bal-
ancing equation involved the governmental interest in preventing aliens
from entering the country weighed against the constitutional guarantee
of privacy.4 15 In Tarbert, the equation involved the state's interest in de-
tecting drunk driving against the constitutional guarantee of privacy.4 7
In Martinez-Fuerte, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that in
balancing, the constitutional guarantee of privacy must be given great
weight.4 s Yet the governmental interest in Martinez-Fuerte still out-
weighed the privacy interest.4 9 Chief Justice Nix concluded that the
state's compelling interest in detecting and preventing drunk driving is
even stronger than the governmental interest in Martinez-Fuerte.50 More-
over, this compelling interest cannot adequately be handled by "tradi-
tional" law enforcement procedures because of the scope of the
problem and the difficulty of detection. 5 1 Chief Justice Nix therefore
concluded that the standard sobriety roadblock is constitutionally
permissible.
ChiefJustice Nix offered guidelines for sobriety roadblocks which, if
followed, would reduce the intrusiveness of the roadblock and would
increase the likelihood that the roadblock would be valid.5 2 First, the
checkpoint should involve only a momentary stop so that an officer can
43. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa. Super. 49, 64-65, 519
A.2d 984, 992-93 (1986) (held that degree of discretion possessed by field of-
ficers rendered procedures in sobriety checkpoint constitutionally infirm).
44. Tarberl, 517 Pa. at 293, 535 A.2d at 1043.
45. Id. at 290-91, 535 A.2d 1041-42.
46. Alarlinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-60.
47. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 291, 535 A.2d at 1042.
48. .14artinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560-62.
49. Id.
50. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 291, 535 A.2d at 1042 (drunk driving exacts terrible
cost in terms of human life, injury and potential "for no reason except the tran-
sitory pleasure of the drunk") (citing Commonwealth v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 313,
495 A.2d 928, 936 (1985); Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244. 249, 470
A.2d 1339, 1341 (1983) (800 killed and 19,499 seriously injured in alcohol-re-
lated traffic accidents in Pennsylvania during 1981); Commonwealth v. I.eninskv,
369 Pa. Super. 49, 58, 519 A.2d 984, 989 (1986) (950 killed in alcohol-related
traffic accidents in Pennsylvania during 1981).
Chief Justice Nix stated that the governmental interest in stopping illegal
immigration is primarily economic in nature. Tarber, 517 Pa. at 291, 535 A.2d at
1042.
51. Tarberl, 517 Pa. at 291, 535 A.2d at 1042.
52. Id. at 293, 535 A.2d at 1043.
662 [Vol. 34: p. 655
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make a brief, trained observation of the driver without any physical
search of the vehicle. 5 3 Second, the motorist should have no unneces-
sary surprise; the nature of the stop should be made known in advance
by some type of sign or warning.5 4 Finally, the police officers con-
ducting the roadblocks should work under prescribed standards so as to
curtail the possibility of arbitrary treatment of motorists. 55 A sobriety
roadblock conducted substantially in compliance with ChiefJustice Nix's
guidelines satisfies the search and seizure provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 5 6
B. Justice Papadakos' View: Concurring Opinion
Justice Papadakos concurred in the result of Tarbert, based upon the
lack of statutory authorization for sobriety roadblocks. 5 7 Justice
Papadakos also agreed that there is a "constitutional justification for
non-discriminatory, systematic roadblocks conducted by police under
well-defined parameters., 58 Justice Papadakos strongly contended,
however, that the plurality's discussion of the constitutional issue was
obiter dictum. 59
C. Justice Zappala's View: Concurring Opinion
Although concurring with the plurality in the statutory resolution of
the case, Justice Zappala disagreed with the determination that sobriety
checkpoints are valid under the Pennsylvania Constitution.1t 1 Justice
Zappala concluded that the court should follow the plain meaning of the
search and seizure provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which re-
quires a finding of probable cause.' i l He noted that while drunk driving
is a "deplorable problem of our current society," the court is con-
strained to follow the constitution. 62 "[I]n essence, [the plurality opin-
53. Id.
54. Id. ChiefJustice Nix stated: "To avoid unnecessary surprise to motor-
ists, the existence of a roadblock can be so conducted as to be ascertainable from
a reasonable distance or otherwise made knowable in advance." Id.
55. Id. For example, the decision to conduct a roadblock and the time and
place involved should be reserved for prior administrative approval, thus remov-
ing discretion from police officers. Id., 535 A.2d at 1043.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 301, 535 A.2d at 1047 (PapadakosJ., concurring).
58. Id. (Papadakos, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 302, 535 A.2d at 1047 (Papadakos. J., concurring). "[WIlhen a
case raises constitutional and non-constitutional issues, we should not reach the
constitutional issues if the case can properly be decided on non-constitutional
grounds." Id. at '301-02, 535 A.2d at 1047 (Papadakos, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
60. Id. at 298, 535 A.2d at 1045 (Zappala, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 301, 535 A.2d at 1047 (Zappala,,J., concurring). Article 1. section
8 states that no search or seizure may be conducted "without probable cause."
Id. at 299, 535 A.2d at 1046 (Zappala1,J., concurring).
62. Id. (Zappala,.J., concurring).
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ion] destroys [the] constitutionally guaranteed protections to effect a
solution to a social problem."' 63 Justice Zappala concurred in the result,
however, only because the decision rested on the lack of statutory au-
thorization to conduct sobriety roadblocks.64
Justice Zappala disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had previously employed the balancing
test in a sniff-search case, Commonwealth v. Johnston.6 5 Instead, Justice
Zappala found that the court's previous decision rested upon a determi-
nation of probable cause. 66 Justice Zappala suggested instead that the
Johnston opinion adopted the dissent of Justice Brennan of the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Place.6 7 According to Justice
Brennan's dissent in Place, a balancing of the competing interests is only
appropriate in a Terry stop and frisk situation. 68
The standard to be applied, according to Justice Zappala, is at least
a "reasonable suspicion." '69 Without at least a reasonable suspicion, an
individual's personal liberties would be subject to a standard lower than
that used in a Terry situation.70 "Thus, while the required end is admira-
ble, the means employed does not justify that end."'7 1
Justice Zappala further disagreed with the plurality's reliance on
Martinez-Fuerte.7 2 He asserted that the governmental purposes at issue
in Martinez-Fuerte and the present case were clearly different; one case
63. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring).
64. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Zappala asserted that the
plurality opinion is only an advisory opinion on the constitutionality issue. Id.
(Zappala, J., concurring).
65. 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74 (1987). For a discussion of the plurality's
discussion of Commonwealth v. Johnston, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
66. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 298-99, 535 A.2d at 1046 (Zappala, J., concurring).
67. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). See Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 298, 535 A.2d at 1046
(Zappala, J., concurring). Justice Zappala stated that in Place, a majority of the
United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test between governmental
and individual interests in determining whether an unreasonable search had oc-
curred. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring); see Place, 462 U.S. at 700-10.
68. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 298-99, 535 A.2d at 1046 (Zappala, J., concurring).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting investigative detentions where
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists). Justice Zappala stated: "The
balancing test required under Tern' which today is mistakenly applied to the
present appeal, involves a weighing of the intrusion applied after a determina-
tion of a reasonable suspicion." Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 298-99, 535 A.2d at 1046
(Zappala, J., concurring),
69. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 300, 535 A.2d at 1046 (ZappalaJ., concurring) (cit-
ing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969)). In Hicks, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a Tern' exception to probable cause if the
officer has at least a reasonable suspicion that a crime was in progress. ld. (Zap-
pala, J., concurring).
70. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring).
71. Id. (ZappalaJ., concurring). Justice Zappala suggested that the plural-
ity's justification for a standard lower than reasonable suspicion is the diflicultv
in enforcing drunk driving laws. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring).
72. 1I., 535 A.2d at 1047 (Zappala,.1., concurring).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
involved preventing aliens from entering the country while the other in-
volved detection of criminal activity. 73 While administrative searches in
the immigration context are valid subject to reasonable implementation,
searches to detect criminal activity are subject to constitutional
strictures .74
IV. CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provision authorizes that the
use of sobriety roadblocks is valid under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. 75 This is the lesson of Tarbert, even though the constitutional anal-
ysis provided in that case was obiter dictum.76 This conclusion is true,
however, only as long as the sobriety roadblock at issue is conducted in
accordance with the guidelines set forth in Tarbert by Chief Justice Nix.77
Thus, there is room in any given case to argue that the roadblock was
conducted in violation of the prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Usually this will mean
that the motorist was subject to a prolonged stop, or that the officer
made a physical search of the vehicle, or that the motorist was taken by
surprise in that there was no warning or other sign indicating that a so-
briety roadblock was about to take place, or that the police officers were
given too much discretion in setting up and conducting the roadblock. 7 3
Failure to meet one of these guidelines would subject a motorist to
a level of subjective and objective intrusion sufficient to invalidate the
use of the roadblock under the Martinez-Fuerte type balancing test
adopted in Tarbert.79 At that point, the state's interest in detecting and
preventing drunk driving would be outweighed by the individual's pri-
vacy interest and the roadblock would constitute an "unreasonable
search and seizure" under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Timothy R. Coyne
73. Id. at 300-01, 535 A.2d at 1047 (Zappala, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 301, 535 A.2d at 1047 (ZappalaJ., concurring).
75.. For a discussion of the author's determination that sobriety roadblocks
are permissible under the Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra note 7.
76. Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 301-02, 535 A.2d at 1047 (PapadakosJ., concurring).
77. For a discussion of the rationale employed by Chief Justice Nix, see
supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
78. For a discussion of sobriety roadblock attributes enumerated by Chief
Justice Nix, see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
79. For a discussion of the Martinez-Fuerte balancing test, see supra notes 33-
51 and accompanying text.
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